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The study examines the official bilateral donors’ current aid practice for private sector
development (PSD). In particular, it reviews the donors’ major instruments and
channels for aid delivery and the extent to which official flows have catalytic effects on
private direct foreign capital flows. The major donor instruments for PSD are
investment support, an enabling-environment support, privatization and
commercialization, and business partnership programmes, while the major participants
in the alternative channels are NGOs, governments of poor countries, firms in the
recipient countries and donors’ own firms. The paper concludes that despite the
prominent position occupied by NGOs in aid delivery, there is still a pertinent role for
the governments of poor countries in the delivery of PSD aid, especially when the
provision of public services (or social goods) is involved and the free-rider problems
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major. Also, as a result of the decentralized nature of the private sector, the paper
highlights the urgent need for the coordination of donor efforts, requiring either the
involvement of recipient governments or/and the creation of a specialized multilateral
institution for PSD aid delivery. The study also identifies a number of factors that have
limited the effectiveness of PSD aid. These include the gap between donor design and
local conditions. Further, the paper finds that official investment-related aid flows are
yet to have a catalytic effect on private direct foreign capital flows.
Based on these findings, it recommends, among others, that donors should consider new
approaches to their investment and partnership programmes so as to encourage
technology and knowledge transfers. These alternative approaches include the
propagation of the technology of the relatively more advanced poor countries into
poorer countries. This would require donors to promote south-south business
partnerships rather than the traditional north-south alliances. Finally, the study
recommends measures that could enhance the catalytic and additionality effects of
official development finance.1
1 Introduction
In the 1980s, development thinking shifted from seeing the state as the conducive force
behind economic activities to viewing it as the facilitator of an enabling environment for
the private sector which, in turn, is increasingly recognized as the prime mover of
economic activities. By the mid 1980s and the early 1990s, the socialist systems were
under strain and, indeed, crumbling. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and market
reforms progressed (Exeter and Fries 1998: 26). As if awakened by these events, the
donor community, academics, policymakers and professionals in the aid business,
increasingly focused attention on the effectiveness of previous aid efforts. There were
suggestions that aid efforts in Africa for over 35 years, for instance, could have been
more effective if they had been directed at private sector1 development and if they had
been channelled through the organized civil societies and NGOs. It is worth noting that
until very recently, virtually all recipients of official aid were governments and such aid
was for public sector development (Van de Walle 1999: 345).
Today, the conventional wisdom is that the private sector should be the engine of
growth in developing countries. This being the case, it is only logical that development
aid efforts be directed, increasingly, at private sector development (PSD) which
provides the best hope for ending poverty in the less developed countries (LDCs) and
for ending the need for development aid that could be replaced by private capital flows
(Riddell 1999: 310). In other words, aid should facilitate the transition from a
public  sector  led economy to one dominated by the private  sector and in a manner
which would alleviate abject poverty and empower minority groups in these countries.
Indeed, there is growing evidence that the current target of major development aid
programmes is private sector development and a good share of this is being channelled
through the NGOs rather than through the governments of LDCs. OECD (1988)
confirms this trend for the aid programmes of its member countries the world over.
Meyer’s (1992) account of USAID activities in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador
also testifies to the significant shift in donor aid efforts from public to private sector,
using NGOs as the vehicle of aid delivery. Similarly, the World Bank (1993:  52-4)
reports that since the early 1990s about two-thirds of all its operations include
components that explicitly support private sector development. Thus, the private sector
development aid2 phenomenon is a reality and the role of civil societies (NGOs, in
particular), is becoming significant by all accounts (see Charlton and May 1995: 1;
Steward 1997: 1).
                                                
1  The private sector is the collection of firms or companies that are neither state owned or controlled,
nor are they state-managed. In these firms, market conditions and competition drive production and
exchange. Profit-seeking firms take initiatives that involve measured risks to set activities in motion.
The private sector encompasses all private firms in industry, agriculture, services, commerce, etc.
(OECD 1995).
2 Any official aid or finance that is directed or aimed at private sector improvement qualifies to be
called private sector development aid or in general, private sector development finance. The objective
of this financing is to promote economic efficiency and social welfare by releasing and harnessing the
productive power of the people, thereby satisfying their needs and desires (OECD 1995). In contrast
to traditional official aid, which benefits the public sector directly, the intended immediate and
ultimate beneficiaries of PSD aid are private enterprises and their entrepreneurs. Gains accruing from
PSD aid would ultimately, however, spread to the entire economy.2
Despite the significant role being ascribed to private sector development by major
donors and the prime place given to NGOs in this regard, a good number of issues
surrounding this new strategic direction are yet to be thoroughly examined or evaluated.
For example, it needs to be determined whether the new focus and the corresponding
practices are indeed superior to earlier approaches. First, there is the need to review the
channels and instruments used by donors to determine their effectiveness a priori and
whether donors are satisfied with them. While existing studies have examined some of
these issues, most are focused on either donor instruments or channels. But rarely have
the two aspects been examined comprehensively together, especially through the use of
relevant aggregate time-series. For instance, employing case studies and relevant
theories, Edwards and Hulme (1992) and Meyer (1992) examine only the role of NGOs
in aid delivery, as donors shift their attention from public to the private sector.
Similarly, Pedersen (2000), Gibbon (2000), and Schulpen and Gibbon (2001) focus on
PSD aid instruments, while Phelan (1995) conducts a comparative analysis of Japanese
PSD aid programmes in Philippines and Thailand. Even though Kragh et al. (2000)
outline PSD aid instruments and channels, their main focus is on the relevant delivery
instruments. Thus, issues like the relative merits of alternative channels of PSD aid
delivery are not examined. Further, a conceivable channel of PSD aid delivery is not
mentioned in Kragh et al.’s (2000) study. Second, none of the existing studies address
in a satisfactory manner the issue of whether PSD aid efforts have catalytic effects on
foreign direct capital flows (FDI) to poor countries. The aim of this paper is to examine
these issues with a view to enhancing our understanding. This we do by examining the
theoretical literature as well as data relevant to channels and instruments of PSD aid
delivery to provide answers to some of the questions raised above. To ensure a
manageable scope, this study focuses on bilateral financial flows in support of PSD.
Towards this end, the rest of the paper consists of the following: section 2 on alternative
channels of official finance for private sector development, section 3 on private sector
development aid instruments, activities commonly financed and the catalytic effects of
official PSD aid flows. Section 4 closes with a summary and concluding remarks.
2 Alternative channels of official finance for private sector development
In identifying the alternative channels through which official finance3 can be made
available to the private sector, we are greatly assisted by Kragh et al. (2000: 319). In
particular, from their diagram of aid channels (Figure 1), five channels of PSD finance
are identifiable.
                                                
3  The financing of private sector development can come from within the country or from outside.
Outside financing may be official or private. The scope of this study is concerned with the official
sources of finance for private sector development. Official sources (or flows) can further by
categorized as either bilateral or multilateral sources. Similarly, official sources of finance may be
categorized into official development assistance (ODA) or other flows. ODA are the flows to
developing countries and to multilateral institutions that are aimed at the promotion of economic
development and welfare of these nations, and convey a grant element of at least 25 per cent. The
exception is an official bilateral transaction that is primarily aimed at promoting exports in the donor
country. All other official flows that are not categorized as ODA fall into the other official flows
(OOF) category. These include equity investments, grants essentially for commercial purposes, export
credits or subsidies, etc. It is, therefore, clear that grants by NGOs except those funded by official
grants, are private sources of finance for PSD.3
Figure 1
Channels of PSD aid
In addition to these five channels, two more may be added:
i)  From a donor government to a multilateral institution which, in the recipient
country, channels aid either directly to a firm or through institutions,
associations, NGOs, etc. or even through the receiving government, etc.;
ii)  From a donor government to individuals as, for example, scholarships for
studies in marketing, or courses that are specific to the private sector.
Figure 2 modifies Figure 1 on the part of the first additional channel, thereby presenting
six identifiable channels; the second channel is not shown because it is not significant
for the delivery of PSD aid, nor is it likely to be one in the future. It must be noted that
in all these six cases, the aid or finance is either directed at the international-, macro-,
sector- (meso-) or enterprise-level activities.
Figure 2
Conceivable changes of PSD Aid
A modified version
Source: A modified version of Kragh et al.’s (2000) diagram.4
2.1 Merits and demerits of the alternative aid delivery channels
Each of these six channels has its merits and shortcomings, which we examine next.
Channel (i): Donor government–government–recipient businesses
This channel is similar to the traditional vehicle for aid delivery. Its major advantage is
that it allows for better coordination of donor efforts, as a government is in a good
position to fit the disbursed aid into its own sector plans. This is particularly important
for PSD aid because of the decentralized nature of the private sector, and this can, for
instance, be done through the adoption of a sectoral investment programme approach
(Jones 1997; Riddell 1999: 333; Hyden 1997: 64). Further, the government’s
administrative machinery can easily be deployed for PSD aid delivery to achieve
substantial savings in overhead costs. Also, because government has the power to enact
laws, regulate the production of social goods and social ‘bads’, it often can resolve the
free-rider problem that hinders its optimal production (Meyer 1992: 1116).
Consequently, aid that is channelled through good government and designed to promote
the production of social goods which were under-produced in the first instance because
of free-rider problems, has a greater chance of reaching the beneficiaries targeted by the
donor. Finally, government would have a sense of project ownership, a fact which
usually facilitates effective and efficient delivery of aid services or execution of the
associated projects.
But if the government is corrupt, inefficient or ineffective, some of these merits are lost.
In such instances, governmental red tape impairs aid delivery, especially in terms of
delivery time and quality of work. Similarly, corruption makes aid delivery more costly
and results in poor quality. Through the same political process that often allocates
resources disproportionally so that some are over-satisfied and others (mainly the less
privileged) remain under-satisfied (Meyer 1992: 1116), corruption furthermore works to
bypass the targeted beneficiaries, because such aid commonly goes to those who would
normally be excluded by donors. This often results in a very perverse outcome, giving
the impression that such aid is ineffective. Further, because corruption worsens the
problems generally associated with the lack of incentives for efficient operations by
bureaucrats as these do not share in these efficiency gains (Meyer 1992: 1116), the
expected savings in overhead costs cannot be realized. Finally, as with all aid targeted at
the enterprise level, it can create an unequal environment for the non-assisted firms of
the industry and at its worst, can induce rent-seeking behaviour instead of encouraging
competition.
Channel (ii): Donor government-government-local institutions-businesses
By local associations and institutions, we mean NGOs,4 which include chambers of
commerce, trade unions, labour unions, village associations (usually age-grade groups),
trader associations, farmers’ associations, voluntary (and often unregistered)
                                                
4 The term non-governmental organization (NGO) includes, in a very broad sense, churches, Islamic
associations and even some educational institutions (provided that they are not government-owned),
but in this paper, the term does not apply to these groups. It is used here to include all non-religious
private voluntary organizations (PVOs) supported by either voluntary private contributions or/and
official contributions (external or local), membership-based PVOs, often called grassroots
organizations, and non-profit seeking non-governmental associations including non-profit business
and trade associations.5
craftsmen/artisan associations (for example, bricklayers, plumbers, mechanics, radio
and electronics technicians, air conditioner technicians, etc.), cooperative societies and
self-help groups. While most chambers of commerce represent only a tiny minority of
the well-to-do entrepreneurs, trade and labour unions are often more broad based. In
particular, most voluntary trade/craftsman/artisans organizations in poor countries that
have been in existence for over five years, are attracting large memberships. These are
credible, and enjoy the trust and respect of their members partly because they meet
regularly (sometimes weekly) and make regular contributions with which they help their
members. Discipline is high and obligation defaults very rare (Ibe 1990). Similarly,
most village (age-based) associations are mandatory. Set up to execute communal
development projects, these organizations are usually governed by customs and
traditions, and are highly disciplined (Ibe 1990 and 1992).
One of the principal advantages of this channel lies in the general belief that southern
NGOs, like their northern counterparts, have a comparative advantage in reaching the
poorest of the poor, and those in the remote areas that are often difficult for the
authorities to reach. Local NGOs can handle aid delivery faster and cheaper, especially
when local institutions consist of grassroots-based and popular organizations.5
Furthermore, believed to be innovative, bureaucracy-free, flexible, small, and smart,
these local NGOs have a comparative advantage in capacity building and participatory
development (Smillie 1997; Atampugre 1997; Baldwin 1990 among others).6
Voluntarism is a major feature of NGOs and probity one of their guiding principles,
therefore the trust of the public and donors in their operations is somewhat higher
(Charlton and May 1995; Davis and McGregor 2000). Finally, as illustrated by a
number of donors’ self-evaluation reports, NGO programmes are effective, and it is
likely that donors will favour engaging NGOs in aid delivery (Norway 1995; Finland
1994; Sweden 1995; Australia 1995; UK 1992, 1995, see Smillie 1997: 571). Thus,
their involvement in private sector development is expected to promote a higher level of
donors’ funding, and aid programme effectiveness.
Another advantage of this channel is the involvement of both the domestic government
and local NGOs. This may combine the best of the two worlds because the government
has the legislative means to resolve the free-rider problem, and regulate the production
of social goods and bads, as necessary. The participating NGOs would provide the
flexibility, responsiveness, expertise in reaching the poor to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness of aid delivery (Meyer 1992). Each partner can also be a check on the
other.
                                                
5  For instance, as in most LDCs, in Nigeria there are the bricklayers’ association, carpenters’
association, etc. that have been in existence for years. These associations, mainly through member
contributions, buy the tools used in their respective trades and stock these in the association’s
premises. Members, needing a tool they do not have, can hire these from the association at special
fixed rates. The associations enjoy the trust of their members, majority of whom are poor. The poor
can easily be reached by donors through their respective associations. Any assistance rendered to such
groups will reach the poor directly and with minimum cost.
6 Among such others are Brown and Korten (1989); Clark (1992); Edwards and Hulme (1996); Howes
and Sattar (1992); Bratton and Liatto-Katundu (1994: 562); Fisher (1994); Besley (1996); and
Charlton and May (1995: 249).6
The major disadvantage of this channel is the lack of incentives for the government and
the NGOs to operate efficiently, as they do not share in the efficiency gains (Meyer
1992). However, voluntarism and the missionary spirit of the NGOs are expected to
cater for this. Another demerit is that NGO/government involvement creates the
possibility of conflict between the two, with disappointing outcomes, particularly so if
the government is corrupt.
Some scholars have expressed doubts about the benefits usually credited to NGOs
(Stewart 1997; Tendler 1982; Robinson 1992, etc.). But it is worth noting while these
critical observations can be rather helpful in avoiding past mistakes, they do not negate
the generally acknowledged virtues of NGOs.7
Available evidence, furthermore, suggests that the donor/NGO ‘partnerships’ may have
proven to be satisfactory. The role of NGOs in aid delivery has, over time, become
significant and their activities increasingly diversified.8 As NGOs rely on official donors
for their financing (see Table 1), and as official donors have shifted their focus to PSD,
this is correspondingly reflected in the diversified NGO involvement in PSD activities.9
Today, donors support NGOs with outright grants, channel some of the ODA through
NGOs, and engage them as contractors in the delivery of aid. As can be seen from
Table 1, and Figure 3, the ODA channelled through the NGOs and the level of official
Table 1
Bilateral development assistance and NGOs levels of activities, 1970-2000
Period average 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000 Average(a
($ billion)
Bilateral ODA net disbursements 9.3 22.9 39.1 36.0 24.1
Grants by NGOs 1.3 3.0 5.7 6.9 3.5
Support received by NGOs from the official sector 0.3 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1
ODA net channelled via NGOs 0.4 0.9 1.1 0.8
(in %)
Support received by NGOs from official sector
 as % of ODA
3.7 6.9 3.4 3.3 4.4
Grants by NGOs as % of ODA 14.3 13.2 14.7 19.2 14.4
% of ODA channelled via NGOs 1.5 2.3 3.1 2.1
Note: (a Average for the years 1970-2000.
Source:  DAC's International Development Statistics (online).
                                                
7 For instance, while it is sometimes claimed that the virtues of the NGOs ‘depend precariously on
highly motivated staff rather on the structure of NGO itself’ (Meyer 1992: 1119), the value of such an
assertion is in drawing our attention to a critical success factor as it does not negate the advantages in
question.
8  In addition to their initial preoccupation with the delivery of emergency and relief aid, NGOs are also
increasingly involved in policy advocacy and education, citizenship projects, poverty-reduction
programmes, promotion of entrepreneurial activities, and private sector development (Charlton and
May 1995: 237; Grugel 2000: 89-90).
9  They are engaged in activities that support private sector development such as training to facilitate the
establishment of an enabling private sector environment, promoting health and safety in the sector’s
workplaces, providing credits for small-scale enterprises, promoting foreign-local firm partnership in
business, etc.7
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Notes: (a) The dependent variables are indicated in the first column and they are all sourced from the
OECD’s IDS (online), except the GDP which is from the World Bank’s Global Development
Indicators (online). The regressors (except the political variable) are also from the World Bank’s
GDI indicators. Political variable is from Beck et al. (2000).
(b) The estimates are panel data-based and the fixed-effect OLS method was employed in
deriving the estimates.
(c) The figures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. At 10%; 5%; and
1% levels of significance, the parameter estimates are statistically significant if its t-value, in
absolute sense, are up to 1.6; 2.0; and 2.6, respectively.
Figure 3


























Support received by NGOs from official sector
ODA net channelled via NGOs8
support to NGOs constitute just about 7 per cent (i.e., about 2.1 and 4.4 per cent,
respectively) of ODA, but account for as much as about 25 and 48 per cent,
respectively, of NGOs total grants in 1995, or together, about 73 per cent. By the time
account is taken of the role of NGOs as contractors to official donors, the story of the
NGOs partnership (or should we say, NGOs’ dependence on official donors) is well
documented. Even though a noticeable decline has been recorded since 1995 in both
official support to NGOs, and aid channelled through them, a deeper analysis suggests
that the honeymoon may not be over yet. To conduct such an analysis, we formulate and
estimate the model given in Table 2.
The model postulates that the determinants of the level of donor ODA relative to GDP
granted in support of NGOs as well as the share of donor ODA for NGO support,
respectively, are the levels of economic prosperity in the donor country (growth in per
capita income and upturn in economic cycle), the level of donor government
expenditures, whether or not the donor government is right wing,10 and whether or not
the donor is satisfied with the effectiveness of support given to the NGOs in the past or
the level of generosity (measured by the trend variable, t) is declining. Similarly, it
postulates that the level of NGO grants relative to donor GDP is determined by the same
set of factors, with the trend variable(t) representing the extent to which NGOs and their
major funding sources are satisfied with the effectiveness of NGOs own past
programmes or the extent of their generosity.
A priori, it is expected that prosperity in the donor country  (growth in per capita
income and an upturn in the economic cycle) and increased donor government
expenditures increase the GDP portion that is allocated to ODA and is channelled
through NGOs; positive coefficients are expected. On the other hand, a right-wing
government often discourages ODA in general and therefore decreases the volume of
aid channelled through NGOs; negative coefficients are expected. Similarly, economic
prosperity and increased government expenditures (that increase government support to
NGOs in general) are expected to have a favourable effect on net grants by NGOs to
poor countries. In the case of ODA-GDP-ratio equation, a positive coefficient for t
suggests an increasing donor generosity over time. For the second equation, it suggests
that donors are satisfied with the effectiveness of previous aid allocations to (or
through) the NGO channel, while in the third equation, it suggests an increasing
generosity on the part of NGOs themselves or the major funding sources.
Judging by the statistical properties of the estimated equations in Table 2 and noting the
fact that panel data (like cross sectional data) are often associated with low R
2, we
believe that the estimated models have good statistical properties and that the sign
expectations are, in most cases, met. Therefore, they are reliable estimates on the whole,
from which valid inferences can be made.
These empirical results in Table 2 imply that the share of official support to national
NGOs in relation to GDP increases with an upturn in the economic cycle, with
increased government expenditures and with increased per capita incomes in the donor
countries, but the per capita income variable is not statistically significant. Official
                                                
10 If the executive arm of government is right wing, centre or left wing, a value of 1, 0 and –1 is
awarded, respectively. The same is repeated if the legislature is dominated by the right wing, centre,
and left wing party. This means that the value of this variable ranges between –2 (both executive and
legislature are of left-wing type) and 2 (both executive and legislature are of right-wing type).9
support to national NGOs relative to total ODA increases as the economic cycle
up-swings and as government expenditures increase, but—against expectations and for
reasons yet unknown—decreases with increased per capita incomes in the donor
country. Similarly, grants by NGOs increase with increased per capita income and
increased government expenditures, but decrease with an upturn in the economic cycle
(though this is not statistically significant at 5 per cent level of significance) and have a
negative significant trend. The estimated coefficient of t in the first equation suggests
that donor generosity to NGOs is declining, although the decline is not statistically
significant. The significant positive coefficient for t in the second equation suggests that
donors are satisfied with the effectiveness of previous aid allocations to NGOs while the
significant negative coefficient for t in the third equation suggests a decreasing
generosity on the part of NGOs themselves or their major funding sources. Thus, while
donor generosity may be weaning, the honeymoon between donors and non-
governmental organizations appears to be far from over, as an increasing proportion of
ODA is being committed (after adjusting for other factors) in support of NGOs,
probably as a result of their continued satisfactory performance.
It is worth noting that while the NGOs statistics, which forms the basis of our
observations and conclusions, relates to all NGOs in general, it is expected that the same
results apply with equal ease to those NGOs specialized in PSD activities.
Channel (iii): Donor government–donor businesses–recipient businesses 
In this option, as in channels (iv)-(vi) discussed below, the government in the recipient
country is not involved in the delivery of official support. Thus, the government does
not provide any form of guarantee, unlike delivery options (i) and (ii) above where it
does. This channel is most suitable for partnership and investment support programmes.
Its effectiveness is less influenced by the quality of government in the recipient country.
It has the advantage of being able to demonstrate the values of private sector organizing
principles because, as they say, charity begins at home. However, because it lacks a
built-in arrangement for the coordination of donor programmes, it has a greater
likelihood of creating a situation in which one donor’s activities undermine the activities
of others. This is true of all channels in which the recipient government is not involved
in the delivery of aid. Further, doubts could easily be raised about donor sincerity, as it
may be difficult to ascertain which objectives are paramount to the donor: promotion of
their business interests or the provision of genuine assistance to poor countries
(Schulpen and Gibbon 2002: 10).
Channel (iv):  Donor government-donor institutions/associations-donor businesses–
recipient businesses
This, like channel (iii) above, is significantly different from the traditional form of aid
delivery, but both have similar merits and demerits, especially with respect to by-
passing the government. The involvement of northern NGOs encompasses all the
advantages of NGOs discussed in channel (ii) above, so there is no need to repeat them
here. However, because local NGOs are not involved, the ability to reach the poorest of
the poor may be compromised without their in-depth knowledge of local conditions.
Also, this option may be prone to transparency problems, inadequate consultation with
intended beneficiaries and over-reliance on private consultants from the donor country,
as observed by Smillie (1997). The free-rider problem is observed and accountability to
the local public questionable. This channel may be very suitable for advocacy,10
investment support and partnership programmes as well as for sector-level donor
interventions.
Channel (v): Donor government-donor institutions or association-local
institutions/associations-recipient business
Channel (v) is similar to the forgoing (iv), with the only difference being the
involvement of institutions and associations in the recipient country. All the virtues of
NGOs discussed under channel (ii) apply. The involvement of institutions and
associations in both the donor and recipient countries allows for greater monitoring, and
control by donors as NGOs are easier to control than governments. However, because
the chain of aid delivery is lengthened, the probability of a breakdown in
communication is increased. Similarly, the chances of bottlenecks are increased.
Further, as with all channels by-passing the government and concerned with the
provision of social services, the free-rider problem is present, and NGOs accountability
to the local public is doubtful. Similarly, there is no built-in arrangement for the
coordination of donor programmes. This channel could be very suitable for advocacy,
training and education.
Channel (vi): Donor government-multilateral institutions
At present, donors do contribute to multilateral institutions in support of their
programmes. The common vehicles for these flows are mainly grants, loans and
purchase of securities. Table 3 shows these donor government flows to multilateral
institutions between 1970 and 1999. Together, they constitute an average of about 22
per cent of total official flows.
In addition to this common practice, it is conceivable to have a specialized multilateral
institution to which donors contribute funds in support of PSD. Such an institution
would then channel the resulting resources for private sector development in the LDCs.
This multilateral agency could be modelled along the lines of the International Financial
Corporation (IFC) for co-existence with it. Thus, while IFC would strive to source the
funds for PSD from the international capital market, the specialized institution would
obtain its funds from official donors, for a common pool from which disbursements are
made to beneficiaries.
Table 3
Disbursements and commitments of official flows to multilateral institutions, 1970-2000
Period average 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000 Average
(in US$ billion)
1. Total official flows, gross 20.9 49.4 88.0 70.5 53.3
2. Disbursements to multilaterals, gross (MGD) 4.4 11.1 19.5 18.1 11.9
(a) ODA to multilaterals 3.8 10.2 17.3 17.8 10.7
(b) OOF to multilaterals (MOOF) 0.6 0.9 2.2 0.2 1.2
3. Total OOF disbursements, gross 6.1 13.5 24.0 10.5 14.4
(in %)
MOOF as % total gross OOF 11.4 6.8 9.0 2.2 8.9
MGD as % of total official flows 20.4 22.4 22.1 25.6 21.8
Notes: The average column records the average for 1970-2000.
Source: DAC's International Development Statistics (online).11
The major attraction of this channel is that it creates room for effective coordination of
donor efforts. For similar views but in a different context, see Riddell (1999: 333) and
Hyden (1997: 64). Furthermore, as with multilateral institutions in general, this channel
is most likely to ensure that aid allocations are based more on needs and swayed less by
the strategic and political factors that commonly influence donor governments (Rodrik
1995: 177 and Stein 1998: 28).11 The overall effectiveness of aid delivered through this
alternative would depend on the channel being used in the delivery of aid from the
multilateral institution to the recipient.
The proposal for a new multilateral approach to PSD aid delivery being put forward
here envisages an arrangement whereby a good proportion of ODA-eligible flows
(currently about 26 per cent of total gross official ODA) is channelled through a
specialized multilateral institution whose main focus is private sector development. This
is capable of increasing the magnitudes of flows passing through this channel manifold.
It is worth noting that both the EU and OECD have bodies with similar features and
roles to what is being proposed here, albeit on a much smaller scale.
This specialized multilateral institution could deliver aid to recipient businesses via
institutions, associations and NGOs in the participating donor country or via businesses
in the participating donor country. In other words, channels normally available to donor
governments would also be available to this multilateral institution.
3 PSD instruments, activities commonly financed and the catalytic effects
of official PSD aid flows
Kragh et al. (2000) identified four private sector development aid instruments, namely,
programmes to support (i) an enabling environment, (ii) privatization and
commercialization, (iii) investment, and (iv) business partnership programmes. To
these, one may add the enabling international environment programmes or such are
subsumed in the enabling environment programmes. Alternatively, PSD aid instruments
may be classified into just two categories, namely, financial or non-financial
instruments (Schulpen and Gibbon 2002: 5-6; Pietilä 2000: 2; Schulpen 2000: 88-94;
etc.). Donors use either financial or non-financial instruments or a combination of both
in their various support programmes. Financial instruments include, for example, grants,
loans, credit lines, subsidies, equity acquisitions, risk capital and guarantees, etc.
Non-financial instruments include technical aid, vocational aid, training assistance (e.g.
export training), provision of information and advice, management and consultancy
services, etc. (see Appendix Table A1). The major features of these programmes as well
as the extent to which they are used by official donors in private sector development are
reviewed next.
                                                
11 See also Alesina and Dollar (2000: 21); Botchwey et al. (1998); Collier and Gunning (1999);
Devarajan  et al. (2000); UK (1997: 6-7); Riddell (1999:316); Ozawa (1979), and Van de Walle
(1999: 1).12
3.1 PSD instruments that benefit the private sector indirectly
By their very nature, programmes for supporting an enabling environment and those
supporting commercialization and privatization benefit, for most part, the private sector
indirectly. We outline their major features first before the review of instruments that
benefit the private sector directly.
3.1.1 Enabling environment support programmes
An environment favourable to a business concerns forces and resources created outside
the business and therefore beyond its control, but which affect operations within the
business. These forces include rules and regulations, business services, physical and
financial infrastructure, research and development, education, training, societal attitudes
(including trust or social capital in general), information preparation and dissemination
framework, access to world market, etc. Programmes for enhancing an enabling
environment direct assistance, be it financial or non-financial, for ascertaining that the
above-named resources are available in good quantity and quality as well as at optimal
prices. This type of financial support is usually provided at the international-, macro-
and sector-levels.
It is generally acknowledged that creating an enabling environment promotes
competition and thereby efficiency and effectiveness among firms (Porter 1990).
Creating an enabling environment means paying attention to numerous aspects of the
environment, such as the usual factor and demand conditions, the nature, scope and
structure of linkages among firms and sectors, and the nature and degree of competition
that exists (Porter 1990).
Some of the factors of production required in a well-enabled environment are best
provided by the state, as it has the comparative advantage in their provision. Such
services include, for instance, pubic services, law and order, defence and internal
security, etc. Some other goods require the state to facilitate their production through
incentives to and regulations of private firms. Similarly, demand conditions, existence
of appropriate network of linkages and existence of optimal patterns and degree of
competition among firms are conditions which the government cannot provide directly
but can facilitate through appropriate structures of incentives, regulations and
enforcement.
In many LDCs, where governments have been unable to satisfactorily provide services
in which they are generally known to have comparative advantage or to facilitate their
provision, firms have to divert a significant portion of resources to these at great social
costs.12 Similarly, as is well known in network theories, firms develop more rapidly in
competitive situations, when they cooperate to share resources, engage in sub-
contracting, order passing, and flexible specialization. But distrust among entrepreneurs
in many LDCs is at such a level that, if unassisted either by their governments,
associations or donors, they cannot aspire to build confidence among themselves. This
mistrust in the LDCs is apparent in the manner in which these entrepreneurs restrict
                                                
12 For instance, through the acquisition of heavy duty generating sets, construction of bole holes or even
mini dams, etc., firms and households provide electricity, water, and other conventional public
services for themselves. Beside the negative externalities associated with such activities, the
individual average costs of production are many times the cost at which these services could have
been centrally provided by the state or private firms.13
their business dealings to few trusted individuals or to close relations. In addition they
diversify vertically into several economic fields in order to ensure their self-sufficiency,
albeit at high social costs (Cowen and MacWilliam 1996; Swainson 1987; and Collier
and Gunning 1999).13 These practices and attitudes need to be changed by putting in
place appropriate laws, regulations and arrangements. Thus, in addition to the ‘first-
generation’ interventions aimed at macroeconomic stability and appropriate pricing,
‘second-generation’ interventions for promoting trust and business linkages,
competition and generally aimed at creating a truly enabling environment (at sector-
level) in the LDCs are needed if appreciable economic progress is to be expected
(Camdessus  1997). However, creating an enabling environment involves substantial
costs, and donor contributions can go a long way in funding these. It also requires the
technical experience, skills and knowledge that donor countries have acquired over the
years in their own countries. Thus, donor interventions, when well designed and
properly implemented, can make a significant difference to accelerating economic
development in the recipient countries.
Because of these conditions in poor countries, donors often support activities that
include studies to identify constraints in the business environment, the formation and
implementation of policies, laws and general regulatory framework to promote
competition in the private sector, to alleviate poverty and ensure gender equality, and to
encourage private-public sector consensus building. Donors export development
programmes, training and technological transfer programmes, financial sector reforms
and assistance, judicial reforms, democratization and good governance, business
services, etc. (Pedersen 2000: 67).
Major donors include the World Bank, German aid agencies, European Union
(especially via the Lome convention), regional development banks (e.g. Asian
Development Bank, African Development Bank, etc.), among others. Typical
beneficiaries are the national export promotion agencies (capacity building with respect
to trade regulations, export credits, export promotion, seminars, collection and
dissemination of market intelligence, etc.), and governments in transition (training and
education in marketing and modern management, support for environmental protection,
occupational health and safety through education programmes, networking and
sub-contracting among firms, etc. and for chambers of commerce and industry).
Generally, the effects of donor aid instruments for promoting an enabling environment
are difficult to isolate. It is, therefore, difficult to evaluate their impact because these are
often implemented in conjunction with privatization and commercialization measures
within a much larger SAP programme. However, some major problem areas which need
donor attention have been identified by many existing studies (Kragh et al. 2000: 325;
Grierson 2000:42; Schulpen and Gibbon 2001, among others). First, it is generally
agreed that recipient countries are not sufficiently involved in the design of many of the
enabling environment support programmes (Putzel 1998). Consequently, these are
                                                
13 Thus, because of the lack of trust, they spread their resources thinly across many fields instead of
specializing and growing in size to benefit from the advantages of specialization and economies of
scale. The informal sector in most LDCs is not integrated in the formal sector, resulting in the
‘missing middle’, a characteristic typical of most African economies that commonly impede economic
development (Pietilä 2000: 4). But this pervasive general lack of trust is probably not unfounded. It is
common knowledge, for instance, that in Nigeria the majority of partnership businesses fail due to a
breach of trust in a agreement or contract.14
supply-driven rather demand-driven (Kragh et al. 2000: 325), which calls for increased
donor-recipient dialogue. Second, there is not sufficient coordination among donors,
which means that there is duplication of effort (Riddell 1999: 315-6; Hyden 1997: 64).
Third, donors are commonly reported to have excessive concern for the export of the
hardware at the expense of institutional building (Schulpen and Gibbon 2001; Schulpen
2000). For instance, insufficient attention is commonly given to the development of
inter-business and inter-industry linkages. Yet, if greater attention were to be given by
donors to promoting and enhancing these linkages among businesses in the recipient
countries, a significant dividend could be realized (Grierson 2000: 42). But all this
notwithstanding, there is no evidence to suggest that the traditional approach to aid
delivery could have been more effective, as it also suffers from similar problems.
3.1.2 Commercialization and privatization programmes
One of the major activities financed by donors that aims to improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of resource utilization in poor countries is the facilitation of privatization
and commercialization measures,14 usually within a larger SAP programme. The most
direct theoretical justification for privatization/commercialization measures can be
found in private sector-led development literature that has become dominant since the
1980s. Thus, to facilitate the transition from a hitherto public  sector-dominated
economy to a private  sector-led economy, ownership must be transferred from the
public to the private sector, that is, privatization must be implemented.
Similarly, efficiency arguments favouring private over public ownership—the first
indication of the shift in development thinking—provide further justification. These,
together with market-discipline arguments, justify the commercialization of natural
monopolies. For instance, Gillis et al. (1996) indicate that public-owned enterprises in
LDCs were making significant losses in the 1970s and the situation has worsened
during the 1980s. Yet, many of these enterprises continue to exist through subsidies
from governments. Their privatization/commercialization would promote efficiency and
improve fiscal stance. Even though these measures are needed, the huge adjustment
costs involved are often beyond the means of the LDCs. Furthermore, the successful
design and implementation of reforms require skill, experience and knowledge—which
the donor countries have relative abundance. Consequently, donor assistance in this
regard could significantly reduce the associated adjustment costs, making the change
smoother.
The major donor in this area is the World Bank Group; its efforts are also supported by
some bilateral donors like the US (through the USAID) and Japan. The modes of
support include provision of technical assistance and advice, equity investments, and
loans and grants in support of the following activities: (i) establishment of mechanisms
for controlling natural monopolies, for example, anti-trust laws, commercial courts, etc.,
(ii) preparation of privatization and commercialization programmes, (iii) providing
support in the formulation and facilitation of the implementation of appropriate
regulatory environment for the privatized sector and to enable firms adjust to the new
                                                
14 In general, privatization programmes encourage poor countries to transfer the ownership of some
state-owned enterprises to the private sector. Other SOEs (especially those that are natural
monopolies) are commercialized, and still remain state-owned but are required to operate at market
terms. This requires a separation of their management from political-level activities.15
dispensation, (iv) assisting the financial sector to better understand the needs of the
privatized enterprises, and (v) conducting necessary training, etc.
In addition outright grants, grants may come in the form of debt cancellation, while
equity investments may, among others, come in the form of debt-for-equity swaps.
Efforts of the donors are difficult to evaluate here for same reason as outlined in the
previous section on the enabling environment support programmes. In general, the
implementation of privatization has been sluggish and gains slow in coming. Privatization
may even be associated with deteriorating social conditions in recipient countries,
resulting in massive and hostile opposition. These have often beclouded the positive
impacts. In a number of cases, difficulties in finding potential buyers have delayed
implementation (Van de Walle 1989) either because many enterprises are operating at a
loss (Larsson 1994) or because of the general atmosphere of policy uncertainty in LDCs.
Potential buyers are often put off by the unattractive conditions attached to the sale of
SOEs, mainly in terms of buyer obligations regarding the old company’s debts or
workforce, or in terms of conditions crafted deliberately to make the sale difficult and
preserve the privileges of some groups.15 On the whole, however, efficiency gains have
been reported at company-level in a number of countries implementing privatization and
commercialization programmes. These appear to be more successful in Asia than in
Africa because the former has an environment more conducive for success (Kragh et al.
2000).
3.2 PSD instruments inducing direct benefits to the private sector
Investment support programmes, partnership support programmes and mixed credits
benefit the private sector directly. These and issues related to the catalytic effects of
official investment flows are discussed in this section.
3.2.1 Investment support programmes
Investment programmes are of two broad varieties. One is the type in which donor
governments or their agencies invest directly. Another variety is that in which donor
governments or their agencies facilitate private direct investment in the recipient
countries. Under the first type, a government or a multilateral organization using financial
instruments, undertakes an equity or portfolio investment in a project in a recipient
country. Commonly, finance flows directly from the donor government to the recipient
business via the donor government’s venture capital funds and such investments are later
disposed off at prevailing market terms.16 Under the second variety, donors encourage
their private companies to set up fully owned subsidiaries in the target countries. This is
slightly different from partnership programmes that involve ‘twinning’. Under this
variety, incentives provided by donors may be financial or/and non-financial.
                                                
15 In Nigeria for instance, the main obstacle to the sale of the national telecommunication carrier, the
Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), was the demand for a core investor, a difficult
stipulation. If this had been dropped and NITEL offered for public subscription, it could have been
over-subscribed given its commercial attractiveness. It is not unlikely that this deadlock was contrived
by the policymakers and NITEL workers who are concerned that privatization would cancel the
privileges, kickbacks and other corrupt enrichments that the current arrangement confers.
16 When the investments are at market terms, the only aid element is the forgone risk premium.
However, when loans are given at below market rates, the aid element is more feasible.16
Notable donor governments that have used venture capital funds to provide investment
support include some European countries (e.g. Denmark through Danish Industrialization
Fund for Developing Countries, etc. [see Appendix Table A1]), the EU Commission,
multilateral institutions, like the International Finance Corporation (IFC); regional
development finance institutions like the Asian Development Bank, African Development
Bank, etc.
The most direct support for investment support programmes can be found in the two-gap
growth models where savings and/or foreign exchange shortage constrain economic
growth. Thus, through this instrument, donors, by injecting or facilitating capital inflows
to the LDCs, loosen the constraint on growth in the recipient countries imposed by low
savings and poor foreign exchange earnings. When donors promote, under this
programme, direct investment by foreign private firms in the LDCs, subsidiary firms thus
established could facilitate technology transfer through the training of engaged local staff
and the introduction of new methods of production/machinery (Kragh et al. 2000: 319).
The extent to which official donors use investment support instruments of the first variety
is reflected in their equity acquisitions, joint venture investments and other investment-
related transactions in the LDCs. As can be seen from Table 4, Development Assistance
Committee’s (DAC) bilateral ODA-eligible equity acquisitions between 1970 and 2000
are a small proportion of bilateral ODA and of total bilateral official flows, being on
average of about 0.3 per cent and 0.2 per cent, respectively. Similarly, it shows that
donors’ other investment-related transactions per annum in the OOF category between
1995-2000 are about 6 per cent of average annual ODA, 4 per cent of average annual total
official flows and 88 per cent of average annual total official investments in support of
LDCs. In a similar manner, Table 5 shows that between 1995-2000, official flows in
support of joint ventures constituted about 17.7 per cent of total official investment flows
and about 0.5 per cent of total official flows.
Table 4
ODA eligible equity acquisitions and other investment-related transactions, 1970-2000
Period average 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000 Average
(in US$ billions)
Bilateral ODA gross disbursements 11.07 25.66 46.71 42.18 28.28
Bilateral OOF gross disbursements 5.46 12.55 21.83 10.29 13.19
Total bilateral official disbursements (TOD), gross 16.54 38.21 68.55 52.48 41.47
ODA bilateral equity acquisition (ODAEA), gross 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.26 0.09
Investment-related transactions (IRT), gross 3.14 0.73 2.73
Total official investment (TOI) 3.35 0.98 2.96
(in %)
ODAEA as % gross bilateral ODA 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.3
ODAEA as % TOD 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2
TOI as % of TOD 4.8 1.9 4.3
IRT as % ODA 6.9 1.7 6.0
IRT as % TOI 90.7 73.9 87.9
IRT as % TOD 4.5 1.4 4.0
Notes: The average column records the average for 1970-2000;
IRT is the support with respect to investment transactions that do not qualify as ODA.
Source: DAC's International Development Statistics (online).17
Table 5
Official development assistance, joint ventures and some investment channels, 1970-2000
Period average 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
(in US$ billions)
1. ODA-bilateral joint ventures equity acquisitions, net 0.02 na na 0.004 0.01 -0.01 0.01
2. Gross IRT with developing countries (IRTDCs) 0.67 1.28 2.01 1.24 1.68 0.67 1.26
of which gross joint ventures (gross JV ) 0.08 0.26 0.68 0.81 0.13 0.09 0.34
of which gross JV loans 5.67 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.41 0.44 1.17
of which gross JV acquisition of equity (JVAE) 0.02 0.01 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.00 0.36
3. Gross IRT with residents (IRTR) 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.09
IRTR, gross loans to national private investors
(IRTR loans)
0.05 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.05
IRTR, subsidies to national private investors
(IRTR sub)
0.07 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.05
(in %)
4. Investment-related transactions (IRT), gross 8.79 1.41 2.11 1.67 1.70 0.73 2.73
RTDCs as % of total bilateral official investments
(TOI)
7.4 80.2 86.3 67.2 85.4 68.3 65.8
IRTDCs as % of IRT 7.6 90.9 94.9 74.3 98.8 92.4 76.5
Gross JV as % of TOI 0.9 16.3 29.3 43.9 6.3 9.4 17.7
Gross JV as % of TOD 0.1 0.4 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.5
Notes:  IRT stands for support for investment-related transactions;
The average column records the average for 1995-2000;
TOD stands for total bilateral official disbursements.
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In terms of the channels discussed in the previous section, Table 5 presents the breakdown
of the official investment flows of donors between 1995 and 2000 according to the
identifiable channels. Table 5 indicates that official bilateral donors channelled directly to
the LDCs about 77 per cent of their investment-related support in the OOF category or 66
per cent of their total investment support, mainly through LDCs governments and their
national agencies.
Our observation that the majority of financial flows related to donor investment support
programmes do not qualify for ODA classification conforms with that of Kragh et al.
(2000: 321). On the whole, financial flows through investment support programmes
have recorded a significant downward trend, especially during 1995 (Figure 4). The
factors responsible for this are reported in our statistical analysis in Table 6.
The explanatory variables of the model set out in Table 6 are the same as those in the
NGO model in Table 2. A priori, it is expected that prosperity in the donor country (per
capita income growth and an economic upturn) and increased donor government
expenditures increase the portion of donor GDP to be allocated to the ODA-type equity
acquisitions, and will tilt resources away from the OOF-type. While a right-wing
government often discourages ODA in general, the government, if it has to give aid at
all, would favour OOF-type transactions that are undertaken more at market terms. In
the case of equity acquisition-GDP-ratio equations (equations 1 and 3 below), a positive
coefficient for t variable suggests an increasing donor generosity over time; for equity
acquisition-ODA-ratio equation (equations 2 and 4 below), it suggests that donors are
satisfied with the effectiveness of previous aid disbursed through these instruments.
Judging by the statistical properties of the estimated equations in Table 6 and noting the
fact that panel data (like cross sectional data) are often associated with low R
2, we are
encouraged that the estimated models have good statistical properties and the sign
expectations are met in most cases, as no significant coefficient had the wrong sign.
Therefore, these are reliable estimates on the whole, and valid inferences can be made.
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Note: The dependent variables are as indicated in the first column. See also Table 2 notes (a), (b), and (c).19
The empirical results in Table 6 suggest that economic prosperity and government
expenditures in donor countries, on the whole, have positive impacts on the ODA-type
of PSD aid instruments and that they steer allocations away from the OOF-type to the
ODA-type. Also, they suggest that right-wing governments favour OOF-type equity
acquisitions, though the negative impact of their preference on ODA-type acquisitions
was not statistically significant. The positive estimated coefficients of t in all the
equations suggest increasing donor generosity to and satisfaction with the instruments
of investment support. Thus, the overall downward trend is probably due to factors
other than the lack of donor satisfaction with these programmes.
3.2.2 Business partnership programmes
Under business partnership programmes, companies in the donor country are
encouraged to be involved in partnership with firms in the recipient country, thus
sharing their experience. In addition to capital provision for firms in the recipient
country, these partnerships enhance the transfer of technology, know-how and
management skills and open access to foreign markets. The encouragement given by
donors may be in the form of financial incentives (flows) including investment-risk
guarantees or non-financial incentives like the exchange of information, advice,
facilitation of pre-investment studies or visits, etc.
Theoretical support for the donor partnership programmes can be found in the
evolutionary and network theories of firms. A major conclusion in the evolutionary
theory is that for a firm to upgrade its technology and innovate, it needs to have the
in-house capabilities that come with education and training (Nelson and Winter 1982;
Evenson and Westphal 1995). Another major observation, especially of network
theories, is that cooperation among firms often facilitates the upgrading and renewal of
their capabilities (Grabher 1993).17 Thus, cooperation between a firm in the donor
country and a firm in a developing country is expected to facilitate technology transfer
as it provides the most conducive atmosphere for the development of internal
capabilities of the firm needing assistance. In addition, it provides the recipient firm
with access to foreign markets.
Donors that have funded partnership programmes include Norway through the
Norwegian Enterprises Facility (NEF); Canada through the Canadian Industrial
Cooperation; the EU through its Centre for Development Industry as well as through the
European Community Investment (Appendix 2).
Though some progress is reported with respect to this instrument in general (Schulpen
and Gibbon 2001), there are a number of problem areas. First, the design of the
technology and business models being transferred are commonly reported not to fit local
circumstances (Sverrisson 2000: 24-9; Gibbon 2000: 61). Second, because there are no
clearly defined objectives for many of the programmes, monitoring and evaluation are
problematic (Schulpen and Gibbon 2001). Third, some donors have multiple aid
agencies; therefore activities are not coordinated and there is no transparency in the
selection of target firms and benefiting partners (Putzel 1998). Fourth, problems related
to the lack of capacity on the part of the private companies implementing aid are
                                                
17 Even though the focus of most network theories is on cooperation among firms in same country, the
same rationale is applicable to cooperation among firms across national frontiers, especially in today’s
world of globalization.20
reported in a number of cases (Schulpen and Gibbon 2001).18 This is a major weakness
in view of the fact that the capacity of the private intermediaries is generally identified
as a key success factor (Schulpen and Gibbon 2001; Schulpen 2000).
Thus, it is necessary for the donors to adopt more innovative approaches to technology
transfer to ensure that partnership programmes fit local conditions because, first of all,
significant technological and knowledge gaps exist between the donor and recipient
countries. The improvement and diffusion of existing engineering and technical
capabilities in poor countries is bound to be a more effective approach than a
wholesome importation of donor technology. Alternatively, donors, by redesigning their
programmes to enhance south-south business partnerships rather than north-south
partnerships (Sverrisson 2000: 24-9), could propagate the technology of the relatively
more advanced developing countries (India, Brazil, China, Malaysia, etc.) to the poorer
countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Niger, etc.), the advantage being that the corresponding
technology and knowledge gaps would be minimal.
Second, local universities and technology institutes could be used to adapt donor
technology and knowledge to local conditions and diffusing these in the recipient
countries to bridge the gaps between the donor and recipient countries for better results
(Sverrisson 2000: 27). Third, donors could, through the use of appropriate incentives,
promote industry-based vocational training using the large foreign-technology based
companies in the recipient country (Sverrisson 2000: 28).19
It is worth noting that the effectiveness of PSD aid within this category is enhanced
when efforts are made, as is done by some donors, to provide potential investors with
some investment risk insurance coverage. Other than this, a specialized guarantee
arrangement, modelled after the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
could better serve the purpose. Under this arrangement, donor governments contribute
to a specialized multilateral institution whose only agenda is to insure investment risks
with respect to suitable foreign private-sector investments in eligible poor countries.
Overall, existing studies suggest that partnership programmes are popular with donors
and participating firms alike; drawing from Denmark’s experience, official flows
through this channel could be as much as 3-4 times of those associated with investment
support programmes (Danida 1995), about 12 per cent of total official flows pass
through this instrument. There is every reason to believe that this instrument has
recorded significant gains in poverty alleviation in places where it has been directed at
small-scale enterprises; again the Danish experience clearly illustrates this fact.
(Danida  1995). However, in the final analysis, the most conclusive evidence of the
effectiveness of this instrument is determining whether it eventually has a catalytic
effect on direct foreign capital flows to the LDCs, the issue investigated in the
subsequent section. But notwithstanding the outcome of such an investigation, available
                                                
18 Donors should, therefore, make greater efforts at ensuring that the donor companies selected as agents
of technology transfer have adequate capacity for their envisaged role as agents of change. Available
evidence suggests that the chances of success in technology transfers increase with the size of the
donor country company serving as partner because size determines the capability to transfer
technology (Danida 1995), and donors are thus advised to give some weight to this in the selection of
change agents.
19 Such incentives could include a scheme to compensate trainer-firms for the competition that graduates
are likely to pose in setting up similar businesses or being employed by competitors.21
evidence suggests that traditional approaches, with the same objectives, may not have
been as effective as this instrument.
3.2.3 Mixed credit programmes
Some other donor instruments, which are designed to support donors interests, also
promote private sector development in the LDCs. These are the mixed credit
programmes. Examples of these are the credits and subsidies directed at promoting
donors’ own exports, although they can be considered as aid to importers in the
recipient countries and classified under the enabling international environment support
programmes20 (promoting international linkage). But as these instruments raise unique
issues on their own, they are treated as a distinct category.
As can be seen from Table 7, between 1970-2000, official export-related credits (in the
OOF category) constituted about 15.8 per cent of total bilateral official flows for the
same period, with a noticeable downward trend.21  The explanatory factors are
investigated, and the results reported in Table 8. The explanatory variables of the model
in Table 8 are the same as in Tables 2 and 6. A priori, it is expected that during periods
of prosperity in the donor country (per capita income growth and an economic upturn),
the incentive for donors to stimulate their own exports through government policy is
reduced. Thus, a negative relationship is expected between export-related PSD aid and
donor per capita incomes or/and an upturn in economic cycle. Also, in periods when the
Table 7
Disbursements and commitments of official development assistance (export-related), 1970-2000
1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000 Average
(in US$ billions)
1.Export-related transactions (ERT) 3.74 5.61 7.12 3.97 5.44
2 Official exports credits to developing countries (EXpLDC) 2.16 3.73 5.07 3.95 3.71
3.Loans to national private exporters (ERT loans) 1.39 1.45 0.82 na 1.25
4.Interest subsidies to national private exporters (ERTsub) na 0.53 0.25 0.03 0.29
(in %)
ERT as % of gross total bilateral official flows 22.1 15.6 10.4 7.6 15.8
ERT as % of bilateral OOF 70.1 45.4 33.4 38.6 49.3
EXpLDC as % of bilateral ERT 55.1 65.9 70.3 99.3 65.2
Notes: na = not applicable;
Average implies the average for the period 1970-2000.
Source: DAC’s International development statistics (online).
                                                
20 Because firms in the LDCs require considerable output from the industrialized countries both as inputs
and final goods, the shortage of these outputs usually impacts adversely on the business environment
in developing countries. Production becomes disrupted as a result of shortage of inputs or the lack of
foreign exchange. Thus, it can be argued that this type of aid promotes the recipient country’s
international linkages, promoting, as a consequence, an enabling environment. Therefore, it can be
said that export-related aid that is primarily designed to promote donors’ own exports impacts on the
business environment of firms in the LDCs.
21 The breakdown of these shows that export-related aid flows (in the OOF category) channelled directly
to the LDCs constituted about 65.2 per cent of official export-related flows in the same period while
those channelled through transnational investors in donor countries accounted for about 28.7 per cent
of total export-related official flows.22
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Note: The dependent variables are as indicated in the first column. See also Table 2 notes (a), (b), and (c).
ratio of government expenditures to GDP is high, a decrease in export-related PSD aid
is expected, because an expansionary fiscal stance is expected to tilt aid allocations
away from OOF to ODA. Also, when right-wing governments which generally are
known to oppose subsidies (or government interventions in general) are in power,
export-related aid mainly in the form of subsidies is expected to decrease. And finally,
the value of the trend variable can be interpreted to suggest the extent to which donors
are satisfied with the past effectiveness of the concerned instrument or the extent of
their generosity.
Judging by the statistical properties of the estimated equations in Table 8 and noting the
fact that panel data (like cross sectional data) are often associated with low R
2, we note
that the estimated models have good statistical properties and sign expectations are
virtually met, indicating that on the whole, they are reliable estimates and valid
inferences can be made. The results suggest, as expected, that economic prosperity
reduces aid flows through export-related instruments. Again, because export-related
PSD aid flows are mainly in the form of subsidies, they are not favoured by right-wing
governments even though they are in the OOF category. Similarly, as expected, an
expansionary fiscal stance, by diverting aid from OOF to ODA, reduces aid flows
through export-related instruments. The negative coefficients for t in the two equations
suggest a downward trend in its use, probably as a result of the increasing awareness
among donors that tied aid is not desirable and may not suggest ineffectiveness of the
instrument, especially in view of the statistical insignificance of t in the second
equation.
It is worth noting that while donors seem eager to promote their own exports to the
LDCs, reciprocal treatment for the exports of the LDCs does not appear to be
happening. Yet, an enabling international environment can exist only if the LDCs are
linked to world markets for both import and export transactions (Schulpen and Gibbon
2001: 10-1). Obviously, as the saying goes, it is not possible to clap with one hand, and
donors need to open their markets to LDCs’ exports. This can be done through a number
of measures including the provision of assistance for upgrading the primary exports of
recipient countries (Gibbon 2000: 61) channelled particularly along buyer-driven global
commodity chains, and the elimination of discriminatory tariff and non-tariff barriers
against the LDCs, etc. (Schulpen 2000: 97).23
3.2.4 The catalytic effects of official PSD financial flows
We investigate in this section whether official financial flows supporting PSD
encourage private capital flows, as is hoped by official donors, or they are led by private
flows. It is assumed that official donors would prefer to have private capital flows
re-enforce official development financing, as this would accelerate economic growth,
which in time would eliminate the need for development assistance. However, in real
life, there are four possible outcomes. First, official financing stimulates private capital
flows so that these together produce greater effect, the so-called ‘additionality’
phenomenon. Second, official financing crowds-out or becomes a substitute for private
capital flows, causing private financing to flee as official financing flows in. Third, the
two types of financing are independent, so that one does not affect the other. Fourth,
private capital flows lead official flows so that they add up, but in this case (as with the
first case) the ‘additionality’ phenomenon is present, but with a reversed lead-lag
structure. Of these possible outcomes, the second is the least preferred by both donors
and recipients. This being the case, it is needs to be known which of these phenomena
are faced by donors so that appropriate development financing programmes can be
reformulated. With this objective in mind, we undertook an empirical examination of
the relevant data with a regression analysis. Details of the specified models, including
the explanatory and the dependent variables as well as the estimates, are given in
Tables 9 and 10.22
The explanatory variables include all those reported earlier in Tables 2, 6 and 8 as well
as the economy’s openness index, direct foreign investment (DFI) relative to GDP
(present and lagged values) and ODA equity acquisitions (ODA AQU), present and
lagged values. As in Table 6, a priori, it is expected that the coefficients of prosperity
variables (growth in per capita income and an upturn in the economic cycle) and donor
government expenditures would be positive, while that of donor government’s
ideological inclination (whether right-wing) will be negative. Further, as the economy
becomes more open, DFI as well as ODA AQU should be facilitated. The statistical
significance of the coefficients of DFI, ODA-equity acquisitions and their lagged
values, respectively, in these catalytic effect models would determine which one leads
the other.
Based on the statistical properties of the estimated equations and taking note of the fact
that panel data (like cross sectional data) are often associated with low R
2, we believe
the estimated models have good statistical properties and that the sign expectations are
virtually met. Thus, these are reliable estimates and valid inferences can be made.
Estimates in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that official flows have no catalytic effects on
private capital flows. Neither do the private capital flows have catalytic effects on
official PSD aid flows because none of the relevant coefficients are statistically
significant. The two types of flows are independent of each other.
Because the long-run objective of the donors is to ensure that private finance flows
eventually replace official development finance, the absence of any significant catalytic
effects that are associated with official PSD finance flows is worrisome. This suggests
                                                
22 Though more appropriate statistics for estimating catalytic models are those for the destination
countries as opposed to the source-country data utilized here, such data are difficult to come by.
However, because source-country data are expected to be destination-country data order-preserving, it
is expected that our estimates are still reliable.24
Table 9
Testing for the catalytic effect of ODA-type acquisition of equity
(Line I.A.2.2) in relation to GDP on direct foreign investment






































































































































































Notes: The dependent variables are as indicated in the first column;
See also Table 2 notes (a), (b), and (c);
Catalytic role of PSD type of aid means it should also bring in to the recipient countries additional
private capital as the involvement of the donor should signal to their investors that they are
encouraged to invest in the host country. If it is effective in accomplishing this, we expect either
current or especially past value of ODA AQU to have a positive causal effect on the current value
of DFI (in the 3
rd equation above). But if, instead, it is the current or especially the past value of
DFI that has a positive effect on ODA AQU in the first or especially second equation above, it
means the ODA AQU simply follows the initiative of private investors rather than lead or signal to
them.
Table 10
Testing catalytic effect of OOF-type acquisition of equity (Line II.A.2.1)
 in relation to GDP on direct foreign investment




























































































































OOF-type joint venture acquisition








































Notes: As given in Table 9.25
that it is necessary for donors to introduce measures that would further enhance
catalysis and additionality in their financial supports. A measure that readily comes to
mind is the re-direction of donor efforts to sectors with low patronage by foreign private
investors such as micro-enterprises so as to reduce the potential crowding-out effects of
official flows. This—combined with deliberate measures that would give greater returns
or/and ensure some improved scheme for guarantee against risk within donors’ current
co-financing and loan syndication arrangements—could enhance catalysis and
additionality in their financial supports.
3.2.5 Official and private investment flows—regional and income-based spread
Though official investment flows, in aggregate value terms, do not lead private
investments, it is possible that official and private flows may have some common
features in terms of their distribution across world regions or/and income grouping of
recipient countries. This may suggest the existence of catalytic or additionality effects
and may give a ray of hope to official donors. For instance, if the focus of official
donors is the poorest of the poor and private investors also direct their funds to these
target countries, this may serve to coordinate the entire PSD efforts of both agents for
maximum effects. The same arguments apply to regional distribution of PSD financial
flows.
In this section, we examine the relevant data to see if there is any similarity in the
regional spread of official (bilateral/multilateral) and private investment flows, as well
as in their distribution across income-based groups of the LDCs. Table 11, presenting
the volume and percentage distribution of investment finance according to the income
categories of the recipient countries, shows that the focus of bilateral official investors is
Table 11
Distribution of official and private finance according to recipient income categories,











Value (in US$ billions)
Developing countries, total 0.66 -0.01 0.64 3.38 433.87 662.00
Upper-middle income countries, total 0.02 -0.14 -0.13 1.57 194.62 308.27
High-income countries, total 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 1.12 5.43
Least developed countries, total 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.31 4.64 6.90
Other low-income countries, total 0.27 0.03 0.30 0.63 50.67 59.29
Low middle-income countries, total 0.12 0.07 0.19 0.72 58.71 83.65
Part II-countries, total 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.40 181.99 316.31
Developing and Part II-countries combined 0.73 0.04 0.77 3.77 615.87 978.30
Share (in %)
Developing countries, total 90.2 -36.6 83.5 89.5 70.4 67.7
Upper-middle income countries, total 2.2 -348.2 -16.4 41.5 31.6 31.5
High-income countries, total 0.1 6.3 0.4 -0.5 0.2 0.6
Least developed countries, total 11.2 36.9 12.6 8.1 0.8 0.7
Other low-income countries, total 36.4 85.6 39.1 16.6 8.2 6.1
Low middle-income countries, total 17.0 172.1 25.3 19.1 9.5 8.6
Part II countries, total 9.8 136.6 16.5 10.5 29.6 32.3
Developing and Part II-countries combined 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: DAC’s International Development Statistics (online).26
Table 12
The regional/geographical distribution of destinations of official and private finance











Value (in US$ billions)
Developing and Part II-countries, total 0.73 0.04 0.77 3.77 615.87 978.30
Far East Asia, total 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.86 145.40 251.03
South and Central Asia, total 0.14 0.04 0.18 0.48 10.50 16.77
Europe, total 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.26 12.71 42.85
Africa, north of Sahara, total 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 6.50 -0.62
Africa, south of Sahara, total 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.17 19.27 21.91
North America, total 0.12 -0.15 -0.03 1.45 314.00 474.65
Middle East, total 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.20 11.15 27.07
Oceania, total -4.44 -0.62 -5.06 7.09 42.06 -591.42
Share (in %)
Developing and Part II-countries, total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Far East Asia, total 15.9 131.4 22.0 22.7 23.6 25.7
South and Central Asia, total 19.4 106.8 24.0 12.6 1.7 1.7
Europe, total 2.7 38.3 4.6 6.9 2.1 4.4
Africa, north of Sahara, total 1.5 -40.3 -0.7 -1.2 1.1 -0.1
Africa, south of Sahara, total 14.9 63.4 17.4 4.6 3.1 2.2
North America, total 16.6 -373.6 -4.1 38.4 51.0 48.5
Middle East, total 1.5 14.3 2.1 5.3 1.8 2.8
Oceania, total -3.8 -1.2 -3.0 0.8 0.03 -0.2
Notes: Part II countries are those in transition.
Source:  DAC's International Development Statistics (online).
on the low- to middle-income countries. About 39 per cent and 25 per cent of total
bilateral official investments go to ‘other low-income’ and ‘low-income’ categories of
poor countries, respectively. However, the IFC (representing multilateral official
investors) and private investors behave alike, focusing on the ‘upper middle-income’
group with about 42 per cent of IFC investment financing and about 32 per cent of
private investments going to this income group.
Similarly, Table 12 which provides the same data as Table 11, but broken down by
regions of the recipient countries, shows that the focus of bilateral official investment
flows is different from that of the IFC and private investors. While the majority of
bilateral official investments (46 per cent) goes to Asia and is allocated almost evenly
between the Far East and South/Central Asia, the focus of IFC and private investors is
on Latin America. About 38 per cent of IFC financing, about 51 per cent of FDI and
about 49 per cent of total private investments go to this region. These figures suggest
that private investors, in terms of their regional and income grouping of poor countries,
do not follow the directions set by bilateral official donors for channelling their PSD
investments.
3.2.6 Desirable PSD finance delivery and instrument mix
From the discussion on PSD finance delivery channels in section 2 and on PSD finance
delivery instruments in this section, it can be inferred that some channels are more27
suitable than others for the delivery of some instruments. In particular, the review
suggests that the government-government-recipient business flow (channel i) is suitable
only in connection with certain subsets of the various programmes, such as partnership
programmes (e.g. provision of business intelligence, advisory services and facilitation
of business contacts/visits), mixed credits, enabling environment (e.g. provision of
subsidized training, business development services, guarantee for breach of trust, etc.)
and commercialization and privatization support (e.g. writing-off bad debts in banks or
firms in general being privatized, advisory services during commercialization, etc.).
Likewise, the review suggests that investment support programmes are best delivered
through the donor government-donor business-recipient business flow (channel iii).
Also, partnership support is best delivered via channels (iii) and (iv) (donor
government-donor institutions-donor business-recipient business flow). For details of
these, and other instruments and channels, see Appendix Table A2. It is worth noting
that if PSD assistance is defined broadly to include those that have indirect benefits to
the recipient firms, then, channel (i) is well suited for the delivery of all instruments,
except investment and partnership supports.
3.3 Private sector development, poverty alleviation and gender-based programmes
It is also worth noting that the current donor objectives with respect to poverty
alleviation, minority-focused and gender-related programmes can be achieved
simultaneously with PSD aid instruments. For instance, PSD aid directed at small-scale
businesses, rural economic activities (including agriculture), and women-owned
businesses, would at the same time achieve the multiple goals of poverty eradication,
private sector development, promotion of gender equality and empowerment of
minority groups (Schulpen 2000: 96-8).
4 Summary and concluding remarks
The study has examined aid practices currently utilized by official bilateral donors, with
a particular focus on their major instruments and channels for private sector
development aid delivery. It was observed that the major donor instruments for PSD are
investment support, enabling environment support, privatization and commercialization,
and business partnership programmes. Major participants in the alternative channels are
NGOs, governments of poor countries, firms in recipient countries and donors’ own
firms. After a review of the merits, demerits and effectiveness of these channels and
instruments, the study concludes that there is still a pertinent role for poor country
governments in the delivery of PSD aid, especially when the provision of public
services (or social goods) is involved and free-rider problems major. Also, as a result of
the decentralized nature of the private sector, the paper acknowledges the need for the
coordination of donor efforts. In PSD aid delivery, this would require either the
involvement of recipient governments or/and the creation of a multilateral institution
specializing in the task. With respect to instruments, the paper identifies a number of
factors that have limited the effectiveness of PSD aid. These include the gap between
donor design and local conditions, and insufficient dialogue between donors and
intended beneficiaries of aid. However, these limitations notwithstanding, the study
finds evidence that suggests that these channels and instruments are effective and
preferred by donors over the traditional approaches to aid delivery. Furthermore, the28
paper finds that official investment-related aid flows are yet to have a catalytic effect on
private direct foreign capital flows.
Based on these findings, the study recommends that donors consider new approaches to
their investment and partnership programmes so as to encourage technology and
knowledge transfer. These alternative approaches include (i) the upgrading and
diffusion of existing engineering and technical capabilities in poor countries rather than
a wholesome importation of donor technology; (ii) propagating the technology of
relatively more advanced poor countries to the more severely disadvantaged countries,
which would require donors to favour south-south business partnerships rather than
north-south partnerships (Sverrisson 2000: 24-9).
Similarly, the analysis suggests that donors should endeavour to promote LDC exports
with the same commitment as they promote their own exports to LDCs. This is the only
way of creating a truly enabling international environment (Schulpen and Gibbon
2001:  10-1; Schulpen 2000: 97). Also, if donors were to give greater emphasis to
promoting and enhancing inter-business linkages among businesses in the recipient
countries, a significant dividend could be reaped from their enabling environment
programmes (Grierson 2000: 42).29
Appendix: List of acronyms
DAC Development Assistance Committee
ERT Export-related transactions
FDI Foreign direct private investments
IFC International Finance Corporation
IRT Investment-related transaction that do not quality for ODA status
LDCs Less developed countries
MOOF Multilateral official flows
NGOs Non-governmental organization
ODA Official development aid
ODAEA ODA bilateral equity acquisition
OOF Other official flows
PSD Private sector development
TOD Total bilateral official disbursements
TOI Total official investmentAppendix Table A1
Instruments for investment and partnership support programmes of selected donors
Instruments Instruments (specific) Donors (programmes popular names) Description
PART A – INSTRUMENTS FOR INVESTMENT SUPPORT PROGRAMMES
Financial Venture or risk capital Canada (CPB), Germany (DEG), Norway (NORFUND),
Denmark (IFU)
Providing equity capital directly to commercial projects
Financial Loans France, the USA, Belgium, the Netherlands (IBTA), Denmark
(IFU), Canada (CPB), Sweden (SwedFund)
For recipient ‘countries’ enterprises often via support to local
financial institutions
Financial Grants Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Japan, New Zealand,
Portugal, Sweden and the Netherlands
Feasibility studies train, advice and visits
Financial Guarantees Germany, Finland, Fancy (ARIA), Sweden, Switzerland, United
States and the Netherlands (RHI, Popm and IBO)
Insurance against mistral or Trade risk wish focuses on political
risks
Non-financial Information provision advice Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands Provision of information on market conditions, regulations,
contact addresses, etc.
PART B – INSTRUMENTS FOR PARTNERSHIP SUPPORT PROGRAMMES
Financial Loans Canada (CRPSM and Egypt PSD), Denmark (PSD Program
and IFU); the Netherlands (IBTA)
For a donor country’s own private enterprises and for joint
ownership with local firms
Financial Grants Canada (PSOP), Denmark (PSD Program, IFU), the
Netherlands (PSOM), New Zealand (PIIDs and DAF), Sweden
(Swedfund)
Feasibility studies training advice and visits
Financial Guarantees Canada (PSOP), Denmark (investment guarantee), the
Netherlands (RHI, POPM and IBO)
Insurance against investment or trade risk, with focus on political
risks
Non-financial Provision of information,
training and human
development
Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands and Germany Provision of information on market conditions, regulations,
contact addresses and through training of staff of participating
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Government-recipient business, flow (i) Y Y Y Y
Government-local institutions-recipient business, flow (ii) Y Y
Donor business-recipient business, flow (iii) X X X Y
Donor institutions-donor business-recipient business, flow (iv) Z X Y
Donor institutions-local institutions-recipient business, flow (v) Z Y
Multilateral institutions, flow (vi) Z Z Z Z Z
Notes: X = most suitable for the indicated instruments;
Y = suitable for only some sub-sets of the indicated instruments e.g. advocacy and training are
subsets of enabling environment; assistance in form of provision of business intelligence,
advisory services and business visits in partnership support; writing-off of old but bad debts
of banks being privatized;
Z  = suitable for the indicated instruments;
  If PSD assistance is defined to include indirect benefits to the recipient firms, then all ‘Y’ ratings
for enabling environment support and for commercialization and privatization in channel (i) turn
to ‘X’ rating.32
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